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The  European  Parliament  has  changed  significantly  in  the  more  than  thirty 
years of its existence.  Although it has still not  obtained full  legislative 
powers,  its  competences  and  its  influence,  both  w1 thin  and  outside  the 
Community,  have  grown  perceptibly,  while  its  political  legitimacy  was 
established  in  1979  with  its direct  election  by  the  voters.  lor is  its 
institutional  and  poll  tical  influence  confined  to  the  frontiers  of  the 
European Community. 
The  ECSC  Treaty,  and  then  the  EEC  and  BURATOX  Treaties,  originally 
conferred  on  the  European  Parliament  a  purely  consultative  role  together 
with  the  power  of  pol  1  tical  control  over  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities.  The  Community's  budgetary  powers  increased when  the  European 
Parliament  was  given  the  power  of  co-decision  under  the  1970  and  1975 
Treaties,  although  this is only a  partial  power,  relating to the Community 
expend! ture  defined  as  non-obligatory.  The  European  Parliament,  in  the 
person  of  its President,  has  also  acquired  the  right  to  adopt  the  budget 
and  the  right  to  reject  the  budget,  for  important  reasons,  in  plenary 
Assembly. 
During  the  1970s,  the  birth  and  development  of  European  Political 
Cooperation  were  reflected  by  a  variety  of  initiatives  which  enabled  the 
European  Parliament  to  play  an  increasingly  important  part  in  the 
definition and  implementation of  common  objectives with a  view to gradually 
creating a  European  identity in external  relations. 
The  Solemn  Declaration  on  European  Union  in  Stuttgart  in  1983  formally 
established  various  institutional  practices  in  the  field  of  political 
cooperation,  many  of  them originated by  the European Parliament. 
The  Single  Act  which  entered  into  force  on  1  July  1987  is the  first  real 
institutional  reform of  the  Community  since  its inception.  The  adoption of 
the  Single  European  Act  is  the  culmination  of  the  European  Parliament's 
endeavours since its direct election in 1979,  endeavours  which  had  led in 
- 3 -1984  to  the  adoption  of  a  draft  treaty  on  European  Union  drawn  up  at  the 
initiative of  Altiero  SPINELLI.  However,  this institutional  reform has  not 
entirely lived up  to the  European Parliament's hopes for it did not  achieve 
any  substantial  reduction  in  the  democratic  deficit  of  the  Community 
institutions.  Such  a  situation  would  be  inadmissible  in a  Member  State  of 
the  EEC  and  considered  contrary  to  the  constitutional  principles  which 
govern  the  common  political system of the Twelve. 
For  that  reason,  and  with  a-view to making  the  ~utrost ose of its powers  t.l'lder  the Sirgle 
Act,  the  European  Parliament  decided  to  adopt  an  institutional  strategy 
designed  to  give  new  impetus  before  and  after the  1989  European  elections 
to the creation of a  genuine.European Union. 
This  paper  is  concerned  with the EuropeCI'l  Parliament's powers  as such  ard does not 
cover  the  content  of  these  powers  as  provided  by  the  Treaties  <e.g.  free 
movement  of  goods,  common  agricultural  policy,  transport  policy>.  Its 
object  is  to  give  an  overview  that  will  bring  out  the  powers  of  the 
parliamentary institution of  the Community  and explain the  .. d~velno:tqents that 
have  occurred  on  the  road  to  EuropeCI'l  ll'lificaticn.  It will  ~lso explain the EurOpeCI'l 
Parliament's  involvement  in this democratic structure in which it will  find 
its rightful place. 
I I.  IRE  POYER  OF  CO!IROL 
POLIII\.AL  CONTROL 
The  political control  exercized  by  the European Parliament relates directly 
to  the  Commission  via  a  number  of  mechanisms  laid down  by  the  Treaties and 
its  own  Rules  of  Procedure.  Vhile  its control  vis  A  vis  the  Council  was 
originally  limited,  it  has  grawn  considerably  thanks  to  an  institutional 
practice that is continually evolving. 
As  a  result of that  institutional  practice,  this power of control  has  become 
stronger and  has  now  been  formally established by  the Single  European  Act. 1.  The  Commission  of the  European Commtnities 
<a>  The  appointment  of  the  President  of  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communi ties:  Paragraph  2. 3. 5  of  the  1983  Solemn  Declaration  on  European 
Union  provides  that  prior  to  the  appointment  of  the  President  of  the 
Commdssion,  the President-in-Office must  obtain the opinion of the enlarged 
Bureau  of  the  European  Parliament  regarding  the  appointment  of  the 
President  of  the  Commission ..  To  ensure  that this consultation is more  than 
merely  a  matter  of  form,  on  15  June  1988  the  European  Parliament  revised 
its Rules  of  Procedure  and  created  a  new  provision  in Rule  29  instructing 
the  enlarged  Bureau  of  Parliament  to  give  a  prior  opinion  regarding  the 
appointment  of  the  President  of  the  Commission,  after  hearing  to  this 
effect  the  President-in-Office  of  the  European  Council.  Henceforth  the 
President-in-Office  of  the  European  Council  must, therefore, be  heard  by  the 
enlarged Bureau  on  this matter. 
The  appointment  of  the  President  of  the  Commission  is  a  most  important 
aspect  from  the  point  of  view  of  Community  policy,  given  the  Commission's. 
powers.  Here  we  can  see  how  the  parliamentary  majority  in  the  European 
Parliament  has  no  say  in  relation to the  appointment  of  the  President  of 
the  Commission.  This  is  a  weakness  that  forms  part  of  the  democratic 
deficit in the  EEC  and  must  at some  point be  remedied. 
<b>  The  investiture  of  the  Commission:  In  1981,  at  the  time  of  the 
appointment  of  the  new  Commission,  the  European  Parliament  tried  to 
increase its political control  by  holding a  V<;J_te  on  the  invest!  ture  of  the 
Commission.  However,  this  institutional  innovation  did  not  become 
established  until  January  1985  when,  by  208  votes  to  34,  with  30 
abstentions,  the  European  Parliament  voted  for  the  Commission's 
invest!  ture.  This  is  a  new  event  in  the  institutional  history  of  the 
European  Community  and  one  that  was  repeated  in February  1987  at  the  time 
of  the  renewal  of the mandate  of the President of the Comudssion. 
<c>  The  vote  of  .confidence  on  the  Commission's  programme:  Following  the 
Solemn  Declaration  on  European  Union,  the  European  Parliament  now  votes  on 
the  Commission's  programme  following  a  debate  <paragraph  2.3.5  of  the 
- 5 -Solemn  Declaration>.  In  1987  the  European  Parliament  passed  a  vote  of 
confidence  in the  Commdssion's  1987  programme,  as it did again in 1988  when 
it adopted  the  Commission's  programme  for  1988  which  chiefly concerned  the 
implementation  of  the  Single  European  Act  and  the  completion  of  the 
internal market. 
The  new  Rule  29  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  (revised  in  June  1988)  provides 
that  Parliament  passes  a  vote  of  confidence  in  the  new  Commdssion 
by  a  majority of votes cast. 
If Parliament votes against  the Commission,  the  European Council  must  begin 
the procedure again and choose  a  new  Commission. 
Cd>  The  motion  of  censure:  Article  144  of  the  EEC  Treaty  <Article  114 
EURATOM>  and  Article  24  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  provide  that  Parliament  may 
table  a  motion  of  censure  on  the activities of  the  Commission.  This  is an 
instrument  of  parliamentary-type  political  accountability  by  one  of  the 
Community  executives  vis  A  vis  the  parliamentary  body.  The  Treaties 
establish  a  number  of  procedural  guarantees,  for  instance  on  time-limits, 
for  the  vote  on  this  motion  cannot  be  taken  until  at  least  three  days 
after  1  t  has  been  tabled  and  voting is :Jnly  by  open  vote.  The  conditions 
under  which  this  motion  can  be  adopted  are  also  specified.  A  motion  of 
censure  is adopted  only  if it secures  a  twa-thirds  majority of  the  votes 
cast,  representing a  majority of the current Members  of Parliament. 
If  the  motion  of  censure  is carried,  the  members  of  the  Commission  must 
resign  as  a  body,  but  they  continue  to  deal  with  current  business  until 
they  are  replaced.  Parliament  has  never  yet  passed  a  motion  of  censure. 
Four  have  been  tabled in the  past  and  twa  of  them put  to the  vote,  but  not 
one  has been adopted  <Rule  30  of the  Rules  of Procedure>. 
2.  The  Cqupcil 
The  instruments  of  poll  tical  control  of  the  Council  as  set  out  in  the 
Treaties were  originally very  limited. 
- 6,-Article  140  of  the  EEC  Treaty  provides  that  the  Council  shall  be  heard  by 
Parliament  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  laid  down  by  the  Council  in 
its rules of procedure  <rule 56>. 
The  Solemn  Declaration  of  Stuttgart  codified  some  existing  practices:  the 
Council  and  its  members  must  respond  to  written  or  oral  questions  by 
Parliament  and  to any  resolutions concernng matters of  major  importance  and 
general  concern on  which  Parliament seeks their comments  <2.3.3). 
Furthermore,  the  Presidency  of  the  Council  addresses  Parliament  at  the 
beginning  of  its term of  office  and  presents its programme  for  the  coming 
six  months.  Similarly,  it  reports  to  Parliament  at  the  end  of  its  six 
months'  term on  the progress achieved during that period  <2.3.4>. 
More  specific  instruments  of  information  exist  in  the  field  of  European 
Political Cooperation  <cf  Chapter  III>. 
3.  The  European Council 
An  empirical  creation,  dating  from  the  December  1974  summit,  the  European 
Council  of  Heads  of  State  or  of  Government  was  institutionalized  by  the 
Single Act  <Art.  2>. 
The  European  Council  addresses  a  report  to  the  European  Parliament  after 
each of its meetings,  which  are held twice a  year.  This report is presented 
by  the  President  of  the  European  Council  at  least  once  during  each 
Presidency and  gives rise to a  debate. 
The  European  Council  also  presents  the  European  Parliament  with  an  annual 
report  on  the  progress  made  towards  European  Union  <2.1.4,  Solemn 
Declaration of Stuttgart>. 
This  makes  it  possible  to  organize  a  direct  dialogue  with  the  Community 
organ made  up  of  the  most  senior political  leaders of the EEC. 
- 1  -These  exchanges  of  view  also  enable  the  European  Parliament  to  apply  its 
political  influence  not  only  on  decisions  already  taken  by  the  European 
Council  but also on  those it is about to take. 
An  innovation  introduced  in  1987  illustrates this situation:  the President 
of  the  European  Parliament  is  now  received  and  heard  by  the  European 
Council  at the  beginning  of  its activities,  which  enables  the-President of 
Parliament  to  descr1  be  and  defend  his  institution  •  s  point  of  view  at  a 
highly important  moment  of Community  life. 
4.  The  impact  of own-initiative or urgent debates and resglutigns 
The  political,  institutional  and  media  impact  of  the  debates  and 
resolutions  <Rules  63  and  64  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure>  adopted  by  the 
European  Parliament  now  form  an  undisputable  and  normal  part  of  Community 
activity. 
These  instruments  of  political  and  parliamentary  control  have  a 
considerable  impact,  for  the  results  of  these  deliberations  are 
increasingly often taken into account at the  various levels of preparation, 
decision  or  execution  both  within  the  Community  institutions  and  in  the 
Member  States,as also  in  third countries,  especially since  1979,  when  the 
European  Parliament  was  first  elected  by  direct  universal  suffrage.  The 
entry  into  force  of  the  Single  Act  merely  underlines  and  reinforces  that 
trend. 
Article  137  of  the  EEC  Treaty  in  fact  states that  the  European  Parliament 
shall exercize  the advisory and supervisory powers  which are conferred upon 
it by  the  Treaty.  Article  140  enables  members  of  the  Commission  to attend 
all Parliament's meetings and  be  heard on  request. 
Article  143  of  the  EEC  Treaty  provides  that  Parliament  shall  discuss  in 
open session the annual  general  report submitted to it by  the Commission. 
- 8  ~ The  Council  and  the Commdssion  take  part  in Parliament's debates and  speak 
in plenary session on  a  regular basis. 
Moreover,  although  Parliament  is free  to  fix  its agenda,  the  Council  and 
the  Commdssion  are  also  involved.  A  representative  of  each  of  these  two 
institutions  attends  Parliament's  enlarged  Bureau  meetings  and  they  are 
therefore  able  to  reply  to  any  questions  that  may  arise  and  inform their 
institution  thereof,  which  means  that  Parliament  can  deliberate  in  close 
coordination with these  two  institutions. 
The  Commission  and  the  Council  may  also  take  part  on  a  regular  <although 
less  systematic>  basis  in  the  meetings  of  the  Parliamentary  committees, 
which  considerably strengthens inter-institutional cooperation and  thus the 
European  Parliament's  influence  on  the  direction  of  Community  policy  <Rule 
124  of the Rules  of Procedure>. 
5.  Parliamentary questions 
(a)  Yri  tten  questions:  Article  140  of  the  EEC  Treaty  provides  tha_t  the 
Commission  shall  reply orally or  in writing  to questions  put  to it by  the 
European  Parliament  or  by  its Members.  In 1962,  180  written questions  were 
tabled.  In  1987/88,  2629  written  questions  were  put  to  the  Commission  and 
184  to  the  Council  and  160  to  the  Foreign  Ministers  meeting  in  European 
Political Cooperation  <Rule  62>. 
At  the close of  the  1972  European  summit  the  Council  confirmed that it was 
willing to-respond  to written and  oral  questions  by  Parliament.  The  Solemn 
Declaration on  European  Union  codified this principle  <2.3.3>. 
<b>  Oral  questions  with  or  without  debate:  Questions  may  be  put  to  the 
Commission,  the  Council  or  the  Foreign  Ministers  meeting  in  European 
Political  Cooperation  at  the  initiative  of  a  Parliamentary  committee,  a 
political  group  or  seven  or  more  Members  <Rules  58  and  59  of  the  Rules  of 
Procedure>. 
- 9 -These  questions  are  submitted  to  the  enlarged  Bureau.  During  each  part-
session  each  pol!  tical  group  has  the  right  to  put  one  oral  question  with 
debate. 
If the question is on  the  agenda,  its author  may  speak to the question for 
not  more  than ten minutes.  One  member  of  the  institution concerned  has  the 
right  to  reply.  Other  Members  of  Parliament  may  speak  once,  for  not  more 
than five  minutes. 
The  questioner  may  comment  for  not  more  than  five  minutes  on  the  answer 
given. 
In  order  to  wind  up  the  debate,  any  committee  or  political  group,  or 
twenty-three  or  more  Members  may  table  a  motion  for  a  resolution  with 
request for an early vote. 
If  Parliament  decides  on  an early vote,  the  motion  for  a  resolution is put 
to the  vote at voting time  of the next sitting  <Rule  58). 
The  procedure for oral questions without debate is similar  <Rule  59>. 
In  1987/88,  159  oral  questions,  with  or  without  debate,  were  put  to  the 
Commission,  42  to  the  Council  and  21  to  the  Foreign  Ministers  meeting  in 
European Political Cooperation. 
<c>  Question Time:  In principle,  Question Time  is held at each part-session 
and  questions  are  submitted to the  President,  who  decides  whether  they are 
admissible.  At  each  part-session,  any  Member  may  put  only  one  question 
respectively to the  Commission,  the  Council  and  the Foreign Ministers  <Rule 
60>. 
Annex  II  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure of the  European  Parliament regulates the 
conduct of Question Time  in more  detail. 
- 10 -Before  the  close  of  Question  Time,  any  political  group  or  at  least  seven 
Xembers  may  request  that a  debate,  limited to one  hour,  be  held immediately 
thereafter on  the answer  given by the institution concerned  <Rule  61>. 
This mechanism constitutes a  complementary political control  procedure that 
has rarely been  used since its introduction in 1973. 
In  1987/88,  713  questions  of  that  kind  were  put  to  the  Commission,  205  to 
the Council  and  153  to  European  Political Cooperation. 
6.  ComrnittPes of  inquiry 
At  the  request  of  one  quarter  of  its  current  Members,  the  European 
Parliament  may  set  up  committees  of  inquiry  to investigate  alleged 
contraventions  of  Community  law  or  incidents  of  maladministration  with 
respect  to  Community  responsibilities  <Rule  109<3>  of  the  Rules  of 
Procedure of the European  Parliament>. 
The  creation  of  comudttees  of  inquiry,  and  their  powers,  are  governed  by 
the  provisions  applicable  to  the  Parliamentary  committees.  Several 
committees  of  inquiry  have  been  set  up  since  1981  <on  the  situation  of 
women  in Europe,  drugs,  agricultural  surpluses,  the revival  of  fascism and 
racism>.  One  of  them,  the  committee  of  inquiry  into  the  storage  and 
transport  of  nuclear  materials,  submitted  its report  in  mid-1988.  Certain 
difficulties  arose,  in  particular  with  the  Belgian  Government,  about  the 
power  of that  committee  to  convene  national  officials.  The  German  Minister 
for  the  Environment  and  several  senior  German  officials  agreed  to  give 
·evidence  before  the  comud ttee,  while  the  Council  took  the  view  that  the 
European  Parliament  could  not  legally  oblige  national  officials  to  give 
evidence  but  that  the  latter could  nevertheless do  so  without  hindrance  by 
virtue of the principle of good  cooperation with Parliament. 
The  activities of  the  committees  of  inquiry  have  a  positive  impact  on  the 
Community  institutions,  the  Member  States  and  public opinion and  sometimes 
lead to practical action on  the part of the responsible authorities. 
- 11  -! t  shouLd  also be pointed out that  among  the  activities  carried  out  by  the 
Parliamentary  committees,  the  system of  public  hearings  is a  more  general 
means  of achieving a  similar object. 
BUDGETARY  CONTROL 
In addition to its powers  to draw  up  and adopt  the  annual  budget  of the  EC, 
the  European  Parliament  also  has  significant  rights  in  the  field  of 
budgetary  control,  that  is  to  say  control  over  the  implementation  of  the 
budget  and  therefore  over  the  way  the  executive  allocates  the  financial 
resources at its disposal  in the course  of the financial  year.  The  European 
Parliament's  budgetary  powers  were  strengthened  and  established  by  law 
under  the  Treaty  amending  Certain  Budgetary  Provisions  of  22  July  1975. 
which  entered into force  in June  1977  following its ratification by all the 
Member  States.  Under  this Treaty  a  new  Article  206(b)  was  inserted  in  the 
EEC  Treaty  giving  Parliament  the  sole  right  to  give  the  Commission  a 
discharge  in respect  of  the  implementation of  the  budget.  At  the  same  time 
the  European  Court  of  Auditors  was  set  up.  which  cooperated  closely  with 
Parliament  and  also  resulted  in  strengthening  the  latter's  budgetary 
control. 
Parliament  can  only  make  a  proper  decision  on  the  discharge  after careful 
examination  and  continuous  monitoring  of  the  way  the  Commission  implements 
the  budget.  Sa  the  1975  Treaty  laid  down  in  Article  205 <a>  that  the 
Commission  must  submit  annually  to  the  Council  and  to  Parliament  the 
accounts  of  the  preceding  financial  year  relating to the  implementation  of 
the  budget  and  forward  to  them  a  financial  statement  of  the  assets  and 
liabilities of  the  Community.  In  view  of  the  importance  of  this budgetary 
control,  Parliament  set  up  a  standing  Committee  on  Budgetary  Control  in 
1979.  Under  the  Rules  of  Procedure  this  committee  is  responsible  for 
matters relating to: 
- the control of  financial  and  budgetary measures aimed at  implementing 
Community  policies, 
- 12 -- preparing the decision on  the discharge in respect of the implementation 
of the  EC  budget; 
- monitoring the  implementation of the  budget,  particularly on  the basis of 
the institutions'  quarterly reports,  and  examining and  monitoring coumdt-
ments,  transfers and  the  use  of appropriations during the year; 
- relations with the  European Court  of Auditors; 
- preparing Parliament's opinion on  the appointment of Members  of the 
Court  of Auditors. 
Effective  budgetary  control  requires  very close  cooperation  with  the  Court 
of  Auditors.  At  present  Parliament  has  achieved  a  say  in  the  selection of 
· the  Members  of  the  Court  of  Auditors,  for  pursuant  to  Article  206  of  the 
EEC  Treaty the  Council  may  not appoint  them until it has heard the European 
Parliament.  Then  the  Court  of  Auditors  must,  pursuant  to Article  206  A  <4> 
of  the  EEC  Treaty,  assist  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  in 
exercizing their powers  of  control over  the  implementation of the budget.  It 
must  present  an  annual  report  at  the  close  of  each  financial  year  and 
submit  it to the Community  institutions.  Furthermore,  the Court  of Auditors 
may  at  any  time  make  observations  on  specific  questions  and  deliver 
opinions  at  the  request  of  any  Community  institution.  Very  close 
cooperation  has  developed  between  the  European  Parliament  and  the  European 
Court  of  Auditors  on  this basis,  as reflected by  their continuous and  joint 
consideration of specific areas of the Community's  financial activities. 
If  it is decided,  on  the  basis  of  all  these  control  measures,  to  give  a 
discharge,  that  means  it  has  been  established  that  the  Commission  has 
managed  the  Community  resources  in  a  regular  and  financially  sound  manner 
in  the  financial  year  in  question.  Although  the  Treaties  do  not  provide 
for  any  sanctions  in  the  event  of  a  discharge  not  being  given,  a  decision 
to that effect  would  be  of  such fundamental  political significance as to be 
comparable  to  a  vote  of  no  confidence.  That  is consistent  with the  opinion 
delivered before  Parliament  in 1977  by  the then  Co~ssioner for Budgets on 
- 13  -behalf of the  Commission,  who  said that not  to give  a  discharge  would  be an 
extremely  serious  pol!  tical  sanction  and  would  mean  that  any  Commission 
censured  in this  way  would  have  to  be  replaced.  But  even  the  decision  to 
give  a  discharge  gives  Parliament  new  ways  of  influencing the  institutions 
in  the  implementation  of  the  budget.  Under  Article  85  of  the  Financial 
Regulation,  Parliament  may  comment  on  specific areas of  the  implementation 
of  the  budget  in  its  discharge  decision.  The  financial  controllers  must 
take  account  of  these  comments.  Moreover,  the  institutions  must  take  all 
appropriate  measures  to  take  action  on  these  comments.  At  the  request  of 
the  European  Parliament or the Council  they  must  report  on the action taken 
in  response  to  these  comments  and  in particular  on  the  instructions given 
to the departments responsible for  implementing the budget. 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARI,IA!ENI'S  PARI  II THE  OBSERVAJCE  OF  QO!MUNIIY  LBGISLAIIOI 
Judging by  appearances at least,  the  European Parliament and the Court have 
little direct  relations.  Yet  the  European  Parliament  has  managed  to  make 
use  of  the  Court's  jurisdiction  as  a  means  of  further  influencing  the 
development  of  the  European  Communities  and  the  control  of  the  Community 
institutions.  For  its part,  the Court  of  Justice,  which  is responsible  for 
ensuring  observance  of  the  law,  has  begun  to  take  an  interest  in  the 
European  Parliament's activities  in  view  of  the  greater  powers  Parliament 
has acquired. 
1.  Petitions and  the  application of Cgmmunity  legislation 
By  setting  up  the  system  of  petitions,  the  European  Parliame,nt  has 
strengthened  judicial  control  over  the  Member  States.  Under  the 
European  Parliament's  Rules  of  Procedure,  every  citizen  of  the  Community 
has  the  right  to  address  written  requests  or  complaints  to  Parliament.  A 
special commdttee  responsible  for  petitions was  created in order to monitor 
the  action  taken  on  them,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European Communities  <Rule  128>. 
- 14 -The  use  of  the  system  of  pet! tions  by  the  European  Parlla::!ent  and  the 
Commission  has  led  the  Commission  to  bring  a  number  of  ~tters before  the 
Court  of  Justice  after discovering,  through  these  petitions,  infringements 
of  Com:rrun1 ty  law. 
Moreover,  following  a  report  by  the  Legal  Affairs  Com=dttee  on  the 
application of  Co~unity law,  the  European  Parliament  has  introduced  a  new 
mechanis:::~  relating  to  the  responsibility  of  the  Member  States  in  the 
application  of  EC  law.  Since  the  adoption  of  the  resolution  of  9  February 
1983,  and  in  accordance  with  it,  the  Commission  presents  an  annual  report 
to Parliament  on  the  application of Community  law. 
2.  Control  ~~Arctzed  QO  the  Furop~an Parltarnpnt's own  tn1t1at!VA 
Since election  by  direct  universal  suffrage  the  European 
Parliament  has  taken  considerably  more  part  in Community  legal disr:utes.  Above  all 
it is worth  noting  Parliament's  application  to  intervene  ~n the  case  of 
the  Isoglucose  affair,  which  led  to  two  judgments  by  the  Court  of  Justice 
on  29  October  1980.  The  Court  considered  the  European  Parliame~t·s 
application to  intervene admissible,  pursuant  to Article 37  of  the  Protocol 
on  the  Statute  of  the  Court  of  Justice  which  authorizes  all  the 
institutions  of  the  Com:MJni ty  without  exception  to  intervene  in  cases 
before  the Court.  The  Court  rejected the Council's argument  that Parliament 
mu7•  ~rov~ an  interest in the matter before being allowed to  intervene. 
These  judg!nents  recognized  the  funda!nental  nature  of  the  consul tat  ion 
procedure and  of  Parliament's role  in the Community  system. 
Some  years  later,  the  European  Parlia1:1ent  brought  an  action  against  the 
Council  for  failure  to  act,  on  the  basis of  Article  175  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
It  accused  the  Council  of  not  having  established a  co~n transport  policy 
and  having  failed  to  carry  out  the  obligations  conferred  on  it  by  the 
Treaty.  The  Court  declared  the  European  Parliament's  action  against  the 
Council  admissible  and  acknowledged  that  the  Council  had,  to some  extent, 
- 15  -failed to act,  thereby violating the Treaty  <judgment  of 22  May  1985>. 
The  European  Parliament  has  thus  found  it very  useful  to  use  certain legal 
weapons  in the political and  institutional field. 
In  1988,  the  European  Parliament  brought  an action against  the Council  for 
failure  to  act  because  the  Council  bad  not  presented  the  1988  budget  by  5 
October  1987,  the  deadline  fixed  by  the  EEC  Treaty.  The  Court  did  not  go 
into  the  question  of  admissibility  in  this case,  considering  there  was  no 
reason  to decide  on  the action brought  against  the  Council  by  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Commission  for  its delay  in  presenting  the  1988  budget 
because  the  case  no  longer  existed.  The  Court  found  that  the  illegality of 
the  initial  failure  to act  could  no  longer  result  in the  measures set out 
in  Article  176,  1. e.  the  Council  being  required  to  present  the  draft 
budget.  However,  the  Court  sentenced  the  Council  to  pay  costs 
because  it  had  failed  to  present  the  1988  budget  to  Parliament  by  the 
deadline  fixed  by  the  Treaty,  it  had  not  contacted  Parliament  when  the 
deadline  was  approaching  to  give  it  assurances  as  to  the  date  of 
presentation  and  it  had  not  opened  a  dialogue  on  the  procedure  to  be 
followed  in such a  case  Judgment  of  12  July 1988>. 
The  European  Parliament  instituted  proceedings  against  the  Council  on  the 
question  of  the  Comndssion's  executive  powers  <"commdtology•>.  In  its 
Judgment  of  27  September  1988,  the  Court  of Justice  found  <contrary  to  the 
conclusions  of  the  Advocate-General  who  proposed  that  the  European 
Parliament  had  the  right  to  institute  such  proceedings  in  the  event  of 
infringement  of  its  prerogatives>  these  proceedings  inadmissible  even 
though  Parliament's  powers  had  increased  under  the  Single  European  Act,  on 
the grounds that  Article  173  of  the  EEC  Treaty has  not  been amended. 
On  4  March  1988  the  European  Parliament also instituted proceedings against 
the  Council  concerning the Council  regulation fixing the  maximum  admissible 
levels  of  radioactive  contamination  of  food.  The  European  Parliament 
considers  that  the  legal  base  chosen,  1. e.  Article  31  of  the  EURATOM 
Treaty,  is not  the correct  ana  and  that Article  100  A of  the  EEC  Treaty, 
- 16  -on  opening  the  cooperation  procedure  between  Parliament  and  the  Council, 
constitutes the appropriate legal  base. 
3.  Control  gyer the EyropPan  Parliament's acts 
The  Court  of  Justice's jurisprudence also  covers  the  European  Parliament's 
acts  and  the  Court  has  acknowledged  Parliament's  passive  legitimation, 
which  formally establishes it's institutional position within  the  Community 
system.  In  two  judgments on  the  European Parliament's seat,  on  10  February 
1983  and  on  10  April  1984,  the  Court  of  Justice  recognized  that  decision-
making  acts  by  the  European  Parliament  could  be  subject  to  judicial 
control,  pursuant  in particular to Article 38 of  the  ECSC  Treaty. 
In  its  judgment  of  3  July  1986  on  the  budget  adopted  by  the  President  of 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Court  declared  admissible  the  proceed!  ngs 
initiated  by  the  Council  and  found  that  the  European  Parliamenat  and  the 
Council  had equal  budgetary powers. 
In  its  judgment  of  23  April  1986  in  the  case  of the  Greens  versus  the 
European  Parliament,  the  Court  reaffirmed  that  the  Community  is a  de  jure 
Community  and  that  bath  its Member  States and  its institutions are  subject 
to  controls  to  ensure  that  their  acts  are  consistent  with  the  basic 
constitutional  charter  represented  by  the  Treaties.  The  Court  recognized 
that  proceedings  for  annulment  could  be  instituted  against  acts  of  the 
European Parliament  with legal  implications vis a vis third parties. 
On  22  September  1988  the  Court  rejected  the  action  brought  by  France 
against  the  European  Parliament's  resolution  of  24  October  1985  on  the 
infrastructure  needed  for  holding  meetings  in  Brussels,  concluding  that 
that  resolution  did  not  go  beyond  Parliament's  competence  to  organize  its 
awn  activities  and  did  not  violate  the  decisions  taken  by  the  governments 
on  the  provisional  places of  work  of the  Community  institutions. 
- 17  -III.  PARI.IA!EU'S LBGISI,AIIVE  AID  BUJ)GETABI  POVBRS 
The  European  Parliament's  legislative  power,  which  was  at  first  no  more 
than  embryonic  in  the  Treaties,  has  been  increased  by  the  Single  European 
Act  which  creates  a  procedure  for  cooperation  between  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  in res  pee t  of  certain  Community  policies.  The 
European  Parliament  does  not  have  any  formal  legislative  power  of 
initiative,  except  to propose  a  draft uniform electoral procedure,  although 
the  President  of  the  Commission  has  encouraged  it along  that  road  and  has 
taken the same  road on  several  occasions. 
Yet  this  institutional .progress  remains  modest  and  is far  from  making  up 
for  the  democratic  deficit  in  the  Community  which  the  European  Parliament 
has criticized so often. 
Meanwhile,  the  European  Parliament  is reso!ved  to  make  the. utmost  use  of 
its  new  powers.  That  is  likely  to  give  it a  new  ~nd greater  influence  in 
future,  perhaps a  decisive  one,  in formulating  Community  legislative rules. 
1.  The  consultation prpcedure 
Thts  procedure  has  not  been affected by  the  entry into force  of  the Single 
European  Act.  The  EEC  Treaty makes  it obligatory for the Council  to consult 
the  European  Parliament  on  several  sectors  of  Community  activity,  such as 
the  free  movement  of  goods  <Article  14>,  the  common  agricultural  policy 
<Article  43),  the  right  of  establishment  <Article  54>,  transport  policy 
<Article  75>  ·and  association agreements  <Article 228>. 
One  important  institutional  development  that  has  gained  ground  over  the 
years is the  optional  consultation of  Parliament  by  the  Council  on  most  of 
the  Commission's  legislative  proposals  <Council  declarations to  Parliament 
in 1964,  1968,  1973  and  1982>. 
- 18  -• 
For its part,  the Single  Act  introduces  new  areas of consultation,  such as 
economic  and  social  cohesion  <Article  130  D>,  technological  research  and 
development  <Article  130  Q>  and the environment  <Article 130  S>. 
<a>  The  Council  forwards  the  CoDDdssion's  proposals  to  the  European 
Parliament  for its opinion.  The  President  of  the  European  Parliament  refers 
the  proposals  to  the  committee  responsible  for  consideration  and  possibly 
to  other  committees  for  their  opinion  <Rule  36  of  the  European 
Parliament's Rules of  Procedure>. 
<b>  HxaDdnation  of  the validity of the legal  base.  This examination is of 
fundamental  importance,  for  the  legal  base  determines  whether  the 
cooperation or the consultation procedure apply to the Commission  proposal. 
For that  reason,  the  European Parliament's Rules of  Procedure  now  make  this 
examination  obligatory.  Where  there  is  any  dispute  about  the  valid!  ty  of 
the  legal  base,  the  committee  responsible  may  refer  the  matter  to 
Parliament,  reporting orally or in writing  <Rule  36<3>>. 
This  system  is  designed  to  ensure  respect  for  Parliament  • s  powers  during 
the consultation or cooperation procedure. 
In  practice  difficulties  can  certainly  arise  and  in  that  case  it  is 
important  to  persuade  the  Commission  to  reconsider  its  choice  of  legal 
base. 
Accordingly,  on  4  March  1988,  the  European  Parliament  instituted 
proceedings  against  the  Council  for·annulment  of  a  regulation  fixing  the 
maximum  levels  of  radiactive  contamination  of  food,  mainly  on  the  grounds 
that the Council's legal  base  was  not appropriate. 
• 
<c > Procedures designed to speed up the decision-naking process: 
- Urient  procedure;  A request for  urgent  procedure  may  be  made  by  the· 
President of  the  European  Parliament,  by  a  commdttee,  by  a  least  twenty-
three Members,  by  the Commission  or by  the Council.  This request  must  be 
- 19  -made  in  writing  and  supported  by  reasons.  The  vote  on  the  request  is 
taken  at  the  beginning  of  the  sitting  following  that  during  which 
notification  was  given  of  the  request.  Before  the  vote,  only  the  person 
making  the  request,  one  speaker  in  favour,  one  speaker  against  and  the 
chairman  and/or  rapporteur  of  the  committee  responsible  may  be  heard.  In 
this way  Parliament  tries to prevent  this procedure being abused or used 
against  it  to  weaken  its  institutional  position,  as  it  would,  for 
example,  if  the  Council,  after  delaying  its  deliberations,  requested 
urgent  procedure  in  order  to  make  up  for  lost  time  at  the  cost  of  the 
reasonable  period of  time  which  Parliament  must  be  given  <Rule  75>; 
- Pelegatiqn qf  the  power  qf decision to Parliamentary committees;  This 
procedure  was  introduced  into  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European 
Parliament  in  1981  to  speed  up  Parliamentary  business,  but little use  of 
it has  been  made  to  date.  The  President  of  Parliament,  at  least  twenty-
three  members  or a  Parliamentary committee  may  propose to Parliament that 
a  request  for  an  opinion  or  for  advice  be  referred  to  the  appropriate 
comDdttee  with  the  power  to  take  a  decision.  This  referral  does  not  take 
place  if  at  least  one-tenth  of  the  current  Members  of  Parliament  are 
opposed.  Where  one-third  of  the  members  of  the  .committee  to  which  the 
request  was  referred  request  that  the  matter  be  referred  back  to 
Parliament,  the  normal  procedure applies.  The  agenda for this meeting and 
any deadline  for tabling amendments  are published in the  EP  Bulletin. 
Once  the  committee  responsible  has  adopted  its decision,  the  President 
informs  Parliament  thereof  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  sitting and  the 
committee's  decision  is  recorded  in  the  minutes  of  that  sitting  <Rule 
37). 
- Procedure  without  report  and  procedure  without  debate:  Where  they are of 
lesser  importance,  proposals  from  the  Commission  may  be  approved  without 
report.  Unless at least  four  members  of  the comm1ttee  responsible object, 
the  chairman  informs  the  President  of  Parliament  of  the  approval  of  such 
a  proposal.  At  the  recommendation  of  the  President  of  Parliament  or 
- 20  -following  a  proposal  from  1 ts  chair:man,  the  committee  may  deliver  an 
opinion  on  a  proposal  in  accordance  with  the  simplified  procedure  <Rule 
116). 
The  procedure  without  debate  can  also  be  applied.  A  Parliamentary 
committee  may  request  that  its  report  be  adopted  by  ParlialDent  without 
debate.  The  Commission  proposal  and,  where  appropriate,  the  draft 
legislative  resolution  contained  in  the  report  are  put  to  the  vote 
without  debate  unless  a  political  group  or at  least  thirteen  Members  of 
Parliament  lodge  a  protest in advance  <Rule  38). 
<d>  Adoption  of  the  proposal  from  the  Commission:  The  committee  responsible 
or  Parliament  in  plenary sitting may  adopt  amendments  to  the  proposal  and 
amend  the proposal  to that effect.  The  European Parliament  may  also approve 
a  proposal  as  it  stands  or  reject  it.  Parliament  votes  first  on  the 
amndments  to the  proposal,  then on  the proposal,  amended  or otherwise,  then 
on  the  amendments  to  the  draft  legislative  resolution,  then  on  the  draft 
legislative  resolution. as  a  whole,  which  only  contains  a  statement  as  to 
whether  Parliament  approves,  rejects  or  proposes  amendments  to  the 
Commission's  proposal  and  any  procedural  requests.  The  consultation 
procedure is concluded if the draft legislative resolution is adopted. 
The  text  of  the  proposal  as  approved  by  Parliament  and  its  accompanying 
resolution are  forwarded  to  the  Council  and  Commission  by  the  President  as 
Parliament's opinion. 
<e>  Request  for  withdrawal:  If  a  Commission  proposal  fails  to  secure  a 
majority  of  the  votes  cast,  the  President  may,  before  Parliament  votes  on 
the  draft  legislative  resolution,  request  the  Commission  to  withdraw  the 
proposal.  If the  Commission  does  so,  the  President  of  Parliament  holds  the 
consultation  procedure  on  the  procedure  to  be  superfl.uous  and  informs  the 
Council  accordingly.  If  the  Commission  does  not  withdraw  1 ts  proposal, 
Parliament  refers  the  matter  back  to  the  committee  responsible  without 
voting on  the  draft  legislative  resolution.  In  this  case,  the  committee 
- 2{  -responsible  reports  back  to  Parliament  within  a  period  decided  by 
Parliament  which  may  not exceed two  months. 
The  object  of  this  procedure  is to  exercize  pressure  on  the  Commission  so 
that it will  take  account  of Parliament's views on  the proposal  in question 
<Rule  39>. 
(f)  PostponeDent of vote:  In  order to  persuade  the  Commdssion  to adopt  its 
point  of  view.  Parliament  may  also  postpone  the  vote  on  the  draft 
legislative resolution until  the Commission  has stated its position on each 
of  Parliament's  amendments.  At  each  part-session,  the  Commission  informs 
Parliament  of  the  action  it  has  taken  on  Parliament's  opinions  and 
amendments. 
If  the  Commdssion  announces  that  it  does  not  intend  to  adopt  all 
Parliament's  amendments,  Parliament  decides  whether  or  not  to  proceed  to 
the vote  on.  the draft legislative resolution  <Rule  40>. 
<g>  Renewed  consultation of the  European  Parliament:  The  President  may,  at 
the  request  of  the  commdttee  responsible,  call  on  the  Council  to reconsult 
Parliament  in  three  cases:  where  the  Commission  withdraws  its  original 
proposal  to  replace  it  with  another  text;  where  the  Commission  or  the 
Council  substantially  amends  or  intends  to  amend  the  proposal  on  which 
Parliament  originally  delivered  an  opinion;  or  where,  through  changes  in 
circumstance,  the  nature  of  the  problem with  which  the  Commission  proposal 
is concerned substantially changes. 
These  provisions  were  incorporated  in  Parliament• s  Rules  of  Procedure  to 
take  account  of  the  Court  of  Justice's jurisprudence  <Isoglucose  case>  and 
of  institutional  practice.  They  force  the  Parliamentary  committees 
continually  to  monitor  the  follow-up  action  taken  by  the  Council  on 
Parliament's opinions  <Rule  42>. 
-22 -<h>  Follow-up  to  Parlia.Dent• s  opinion:  Under  the  Rules  of  Procedure,  the 
chairman  and  the  rapporteur  of  the  committee  responsible  must  monitor  the 
progress  of  any  Commdssion  proposal in the  course  of  the  procedure  leading 
to its adoption  by  the  Council  to  e~sure that  the  the  undertakings  made  by 
the  Commission  to  Parliament  with  respect  to  the  amendments  are  properly 
observed. 
The  Council  may,  in certain  circumstances,  request  a  ·renewed  consultation 
procedure.  During  that  period,  and  at  least  once  every  three  months,  the 
Council  or  the  Commdssion  must  furnish  all  necessary  information  to  the 
comDdttee  responsible.  That  commdttee  brings  to  Parliament's attention any 
potential  or  actual  breach  of  undertakings  made  by  the  Comadssion  to 
Parliament. 
The  committee  resonsible  may,  at  any  stage  of  the  follow-up  procedure, 
table  a  motion  for  a  resolution  1nv1 ting  Parliament  to  call  upon  the 
ComDdssion  to  withdraw  its proposal,  or  to call  upon  the  Council  to· open  a 
conciliation  procedure  or to call  upon  the  Council  to reconsult  Parliament 
or  to  decide  to  take  such  other  action  that  it  deems  appropriate.  This 
provision,  as  applied  to  the  consultation  and  cooperation  procedure, 
considerably  strengthens  Parliament's  influence  on  Community  legislation 
<Rule  41 >. 
<i>  Conciliation  procedure:  Where,  in  the  case  of  certain  important 
Community  decisions  <Rule  43>,  the  Council  intends  to  depart  from  the 
opinion  of  Parliament,  a  conciliation procedure  with  the Council,  with  the 
active  participation  of  the  Commission,  may  be  opened  by  Parliament.  This 
procedure  is  initiated  by  Parliament  or  by  the  Council.  The  delegation 
which  consults  with  the  Council  consists  of  a  number  of  Members 
corresponding  to  the  number  of  Members  of  the  Council  and  reflects  the 
political  composition  of  Parliament.  It  includes  the  chairman  and 
rapporteurs  of  the  co:mmi ttees  concerned.  The  delegation  is  led  by  the 
President of Parliament or by  one  of  the  Vice-Presidents. 
- 23  -The  committee  responsible  reports  on  the  results of  the conciliation.  This 
report  is debated and voted on  by  Parliament. 
So  far,  the  use  of this procedure  has  not  proved very fruitful.  That  is why 
Parliament  is considering  taking  another  look at  the  question of  expanding 
the  conciliation procedure  and  adapting it to the  requirements arising out 
of  the  Single European  Act. 
(j >  Failure  to  consult  the  European  ParliaDent:  Where  Parliament  has  not 
been  consul  ted,  although  this  is  required  under  the  Treaty,  tbere is  an 
infringement  of  Article  173  of  the  EEC  Treaty  and  can  lead  the  Court  of 
Justice  to  declare  the  act  concerned to  be  void  <Isoglucose  judgment  of  29 
October  1980,  Cases  137/79  and  138/79,  where  Parliament  had  intervened>. 
This  judgment  by  the  Court  of  Justice  confirms  the  constitutional  rights 
enj eyed  by  Parl  lament  under  the  terms  of  the  EEC  Treaty  and  which  the 
Council  must  observe. 
2.The cooperation procedure 
This  procedure,  introduced  under  the  Single  European  Act,  applies  to  the 
internal  market  <Articles  7.  49,  54 <2>,  56 <2>,  57,  100  A  and  100  B> ,·  to 
social  policy  <Article  118  A>,  to economic  and social cohesion  <Article  130 
E>  and  to  technological  rsearch  and  development  <Article  130  Q>.  This 
institutional  reform  represents  a  first  timid  step  towards  the  allocation 
of  genuine  legislative  powers  that  go  further  than  mere  consul tat  ion  and 
Parliament  has decided to use this to the utmost  effect. 
The  mechanism  of  the cooperation procedure provides for  two  readings and is 
likely  to  strengthen  Parliament's  influence  on  Community  legislation  if 
institutional  cooperation,  especially  with  the  Commission,  works 
satisfactorily.  The  first  readini  is  identical  to  the  procedure  laid  down 
for  acts requirini only  one  readini  <consultation procedure,  cf.  preceding 
paragraph>,  especially for examining the  legal  base. 
- 24-<a>  Adoption  of  a  cOliDIJn  position:  At  the  end  of  the  first  reading  the 
Council  decides  by  a  qualified majority to adopt  a  common  position which it 
must  substantiate  and  justify before  Parliament,  communicating  the  reasons 
which  led  it to  adopt  it.  The  Council  and  the  Commission  must  furnish  all 
necessary information to the European Parliament  <Article  149<2>>. 
The  common  position  is  forwarded  to  the  European  Parliament  which  must 
decide  within  a  period  of  three  months.  Co~nication  of  the  common 
position  of  the  Council  takes  place  when  it is  announced  by  the  President 
in Parliament  <Rule  45>.  The  three  months  time  limit  begins  the  following 
day  and can  be  extended,  with the Council's agreement,  following either the 
communication  of  the  common  position  to  Parliament  or  the  presentation  of 
the Commission's  re-examined proposal  by  a  maximum  of one  month  <Rule  46>. 
Parliament  can  adopt  the  common  position without  amendment  or vote.  It can 
also  amend  or reject it.  Amendments  may  be  tabled only by  the Parliamentary 
committee,  a  political  group  or  at  least  twenty-three  Members.  Any  Member 
may,  however,  table  a  proposal  to  reject  it,  in  writing  and  before  a 
deadline fixed  by  the  President. 
If  the  Counci 1' s  common  position  is  rejected,  the  President  requests  the 
Commission  to  withdraw  its  proposal.  If  the  Commission  does  so,  the 
President holds  the cooperation procedure  on  the proposal  to be  superfluous 
and  informs the Council  accordingly  <Rule  50). 
If it decides  to amend  or reject a  common  position,  the  European Parliament 
must  act  by  an absolute majority of its Members  <260>  <Rules  49-51>. 
<b>  Consideration  of  amendDents  adopted  by  the  Buropean  Parliament: 
Firstly,  1  t  should  be  noted  that  in  the  absence  of  amendments  or  in  the 
event  of  tacit  approval,  the  Council  adopts  the  act  definitively  in 
accordance  with the common  position. 
- !5 -If  the  text  has  been  modified  by  amendments,  the  Commission  must  within  a 
period  of  one  month  re-examine  the  common  position  on  the  basis  of  the 
amendments  proposed  by  the  European  Parliament  and  amend  the  proposal 
accordingly,  which  gives  the  Commission  the  power  of  selection  over  the 
amendments  adopted  by  Parliament.  The  European  Parliament  has  means  of 
influencing  the  Commission  during  this  procedure.  Experience  will  show 
whether  the  interinstitutional  cooperation  between  the  Commission  and 
Parliament is working satisfactorily. 
If  the  Commission  does  not  accept  certain  amendments  by  Parliament  these 
are  nevertheless  forwarded  to  the  Council  communicating  the  Commission• s 
opinion on  them and  the  Council  can still adopt  them by  unanimous  decision. 
Xoreover,  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament  can  request  the 
Commission  to  inform  Parliament  of  the  reasons  which  led  it  to  fail  to 
accept  Parliament  • s  amendments  and  may.  by  a  majority  of  its  current 
!embers,  request  the Commission  to withdraw its proposal  <Rule  42>. 
The  Council,  acting  by  a  qualified  majority,  must  adopt  the  Commission's 
re-examined proposal  and  may  amend  it only by  unanimous decision. 
<c>  Deadlines:  The  Council  must  decide  within  a  period  of  three  months, 
otherwise the Commission  proposal  becomes  void.  This period can be  extended 
by  one  month  if the  Council  and  Parliament  agree.  The  Single  Act  does  not 
lay down  any  deadline  for  the  Council  with regard to adoption of its common 
position at  the  beginning  of  the  second  reading.  This  ommission  may  give 
rise  to  serious  difficulties  if  the  institutional  process  within  the 
Council  should not  run smoothly. 
Xoreover,  to prevent  a  Commdssion  proposal  from becoming  void,  the Rules of 
Procedure  of  the  European  Parliament  lay  down  that  the  committee 
responsible  may  request  a  dialogue  with  the  Council  in  order  to  reach  a 
compromise  <47  <5>>. 
Furthermore,  if  the  Council  fails  to  adopt  the  common  position  by  the 
expiry of  the  period laid down  for its adoption and  Parliament  has neither 
amended  or  rejected  that  position,  the  President  of  the  European 
- 26  -Parliament  may  bring  an  action  against  the  Council  before  the  Court  of 
Justice under  Article  175  of  the  EEC  Treaty  <Rule  54>,  after consulting the 
Legal  Affairs Comndttee. 
3.  Other procedures for participation in Community  legislation 
(a)  Own-initiative  reports:  In  formal  terms,  the  legislative  initiative 
belongs  to  the  Commission.  However,  Rule  121  of  Parliament's  Rules  of 
Procedure  lays  down  that  a  Parliamentary  committee  that  has  not  been 
requested for  an opinion or  a  motion for  a  resolution may  draw up  a  report 
on  a  subject  within  its competence  and  submit  a  motion  for  a  resolution  in 
plenary  with  the  authorization  of  the  enlarged  Bureau.  In  1987,  139  own-
initiative reports of this kind  were  adopted. 
This  procedure  has  become  an  established  means  of  participation  in  the 
Community's  legislative process and  is accepted by  the other institutions. 
During  the  January  1985  debate  on  the  invest!  ture  of  the  Commission,  the 
Commission  President,  Xr  Jacques  DELORS,  proposed  sharing  some  aspects  of 
legislative initiative  with the European Parliament. 
<b>  The  annual  legislative  programme:  Rule  29<4>  of  Parliament's  Rules  of 
Procedure  introduces  the  concept  of  the  legislative  programme  into 
relations between  the  Commission  and  Parliament.  This  programme  is adopted 
by  Parliament's  enlarged  Bureau  and ·the  Commission  once  the  latter  has 
presented its annual  programme  and it has  been debated by  Parliament. 
The  first  legislative  programme  was  adopted  on  25  February  1988  and  covers 
the period  from  1  April  1988  to 31  Karch  1989.  The  procedure  is as follows: 
In  January  the  President  of  the  Commission  presents  the  guidelines  of  his 
annual  programme,  followed  by  a  plenary debate. 
Before  the  February part-session,  the  Commission's annual  programme  and  its 
draft  legislative  programme  are  forwarded  to  Parliament  which  holds a  vote 
- 27  -of  confidence  in  the  CoDmission  and  votes  on  a  resolution  on  the  annual 
programme  during  the March  part-session.  Then  the enlarged Bureau  and the 
ComDdssion  adopt  the annual  legislative programme. 
The  conclusion  of  this  kind  of  agreement  responds  to  two  needs:  it 
underlines  the  institutional  cooperation  between  the  Comudssion  and 
Parliament  and  organizes  the  examination  of  Coumuni ty  legislation  as 
effectively and  rapidly as possible,  while also establishing a  link with 
the  Council  in  order  to  take  account  of  the  indications  of  the  next 
presidencies of the Council  concerning its working  programmes. 
This agreeuent constitutes a  political comDdtment  which  reflects the desire 
to put  through  a  programme  which  will  achieve  the  objectives of the Single 
Act. 
The  progress  made  is  considered  during  quarterly  meetings  between  the 
Comudssion  and  Parliament's  enlarged  Bureau  and  the  Council  is  invited to 
take an active part in this procedure. 
<c>  Joint  declarations:  The  system  of  joint  declarations  began  in  1975 
<when  the text  on  the conciliation procedure  was  adopted)  and  was  followed 
by  other  declarations,  on  fundamental  rights  <1977>,  budgetary  procedure 
(1982>,  racism and  xenophobia  <1986)  and  budgetary discipline  <1988). 
The  object  of  these  declarations  is  to  implement  new  procedures  nat 
provided under  the Treaties but  not forbidden  under  them either. 
These  joint  declarations  entail  legal  obligations  binding  on  their 
signatories.  Consequently,  any  derived  legal  acts  which  contravene  such 
dec larat.ions:. could be  declareci void by  the Court  of Justice. 
The  institutional  role  of  joint  declarations  is to  promote  closer  inter-
in~titutional coaperdtion in accordance  with the spirit of the Treaties. 
- 28-4.  Budgetary  powers 
The  European  Parliament  acquired  its  main  budgetary  powers  with  the 
creation  of  the  Communi ties'  own  resources  in  1970.  The  Council  was  the 
chief  budgetary  authority  as  long  as  Community  resources  came  from 
contributions  from  the  Member  States.  The  creation  of  Community  own 
resources  on  the  basis  of  the  decision of  21  April  1970  required a  treaty, 
called  the  Luxembourg  Treaty,  which  conceded  a  number  of  budgetary  powers 
to  Parliament.  Since  certain  financial  resources  were  now  withdrawn  from 
the control  of  the  national  parliaments,  the Communities'  own  resources had 
to  be  subject  to  democratic  parliamentary  control  at  European  level,  in 
line  with  the  democratic  structure  of  the  Community.  The  Luxembourg  Treaty 
was  supplemented  by  a  second  treaty on  22  July  1975  which  was  ratified by 
the national  parliaments like  the first one  and entered into force  in 1977. 
Since  1975  Parliament  therefore  shares  the  budgetary  powers  in  the 
Community  with  the  Council.  The  distribution of  powers  proved difficult  in 
practice  and  necessitated  a  number  of  interinstitutional  agreements, 
sometimes  in the  form  of  simple  exchanges  of  letters between  the  President 
of  the  Council  and  the  President  of  the  European  Parliament,  in  order  to 
resolve  problems  that  arose  in  the  interpretation  of  those  treaties. 
In spite  of  these  agreements  and  although  a  procedure  for  budgetary 
cooperation was  introduced  in 1972,  budgetary conflicts have  arisen between 
Parliament  and  the  Council  nearly  every  financial  year  since  the  first 
direct election in 1979.  The  most  critical moments  were  the total  rejection 
of  the  1980  and  1985  budgets  and  the  proceedings instituted by  the  Council 
and  some  Member  States before  the  Court  of  Justice  against  the  adoption  by 
Parliament  of  the  1986  budget.  In addition to the  institutional  problems of 
demarcating  the  powers  of  the  two  arms  of  the  budgetary  authorities, 
fut ther  crises  were  sparked  off  by  the  fact  that  in  recent  years  the 
CommLnities'  own  resources  have  been  exhausted  and  some  budgets  could only 
be  financed  by  special  contributions  from  the  Member  States.  With  the 
financial  reform adopted  in 1988  and the  1988  interinstitutional  agreement 
- 29  -between  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  on 
budgetary discipline and  improvement  of  the  budgetary procedure,  which also 
commits  the  institutions  concerned  to  observe  a  five-year  financial 
perspective,  fewer  conflicts should arise in coming  years. 
The  current distribution of  budgetary powers,  as laid down  in particular in 
Article 203  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  may  be  summarized as follows: 
- The  Council  has the "last word"  on  what  is called the Community's 
obligatory expenditure.  This is expenditure necessarily resulting from 
the Treaty or  from  acts adopted  in accordance  with the Treaty,  which  in 
effect mainly  means  expenditure  in relation to  the  common  agricultural 
policy,  which  in turn depends  on  the  common  agricultural prices fixed by 
the Council. 
- Parliament  has  the •last word•  on  what  is called the Community's  non-
obligatory expenditure.  That  means  the Council  cannot finally reject 
amendments  adopted by  Parliament  on  this type of expenditure.  Indeed, 
Parliament  can adopt  them at second reading by  a  majority of  three fifths 
of its Members.  However,  Parliament  may  not  increase non-obligatory 
expenditure at will,  but  must  remain within an annually fixed  maximum 
rate.  At  the  beginning of the budgetary procedure,  the Commission  fixes 
this overall  maximum  rate of  increase  in respect of  non-obligatory 
expenditure on  the basis of objective criteria,  such as the trend of 
GNP  within  the  Community  and  the average  variation in the budgets of 
the  Member  States.  This  maximum  rate can be  increased further,  but only 
by  agreement  between Parliament and the Council,  acting by  a  qualified 
majority. 
In practice,  non-obligatory expenditure includes the appropriations for 
new  Community  policies which  were  created or expanded  in the last ten 
years:  common  regional  policy  <through  the  ERDF>,  common  social  policy 
<through  the  European Social  Fund>,  energy policy,  research policy, 
environmental  policy,  and sa  forth. 
- 30  -- Since the second Treaty of  1975,  parliament  has the right to reject the 
budget  as  a  whale  "for  important  reasons",  acting  by  a  majority  of  its 
current  Members  and  two-thirds  of  the  votes  cast.  Since  the  first  direct 
elections Parliament  has  exercized this right an several  occasions,  in each 
case  achieving  far  more  than  the  required  majorities:  in  1979  when  it 
rejected  the  1980  budget,  in  1982  when  it rejected  the  1982  supplementary 
budget  and  in 1984  when  it rejected the  1985  budget. 
- The  President of the  European Parliament  has  the right,  upon  completion 
of  this  procedure,  to  declare  the  budget  finally  adopted  by  signing  it. 
This  right,  on  which  the  Court  of  Justice  laid particular  emphasis  in  its 
judgment  on  the  1986  budget,  is the  expression of  the transfer of  budgetary 
powers  to  Parliament  and  has  important  practical  legal  implications.  For 
instance,  on  21  December  1981  President  Simone  Veil  declared  the  1982 
budget  and  the  1981  supplementary  budget  finally  adopted  in spite  of  some 
unresolved  disputes,  which  gave  rise  to  renewed  conflict  with  some  Member 
States.  The  Council  and  some  Member  States  also  instituted  proceedings 
against  President  Pflimlin's adoption  of  the  1986  budget  in  December  1985, 
whereupon  the Court  of Justice revoked the adoption of that budget. 
- Thanks  to its new  budgetary powers,  the  European  Parliament  managed  to have 
a  systematic  conciliation  procedure,  based  on  legislation,  set  up  between 
the  Council  and  Parliament  in the  1970  Treaty.  This procedure can be  opened 
for proposed  legal acts that have  substantial  financial  implications 
The  strengthening  of  Parliament's  budgetary  powers  since  1970  has  led  to 
considerable  progress,  but  a  number  of  problems  remain,  which  can  be 
summarized  under  four  main  headings: 
<a>  The  problem of  iuplementlng  expenditure:  Within  the  framework  described 
above,  Parliament  can  decide  on  an  item of  expenditure  independently.  But  it 
has  no  power  to  implement  it.  The  Commission  is the executive  body  in respect 
of  the  budget  and  does  not  consider itself bound  to  implement  expenditure 
- 31  -entered  by  Parliament  for  which  no  legislative  base  exists.  Parliament, 
however,  takes  the  view  that  in  certain  areas,  Parliament  • s  budgetary 
decision  to  enter  an  item  of  expenditure  in  the  budget  constitutes  a 
sufficient legal  base  for  implementing that expenditure. 
<b>  The  problem of  classifying  expenditure:  When  the  1970  Treaty  was  drawn 
up,  an  empirical  classification  of  expend! ture  into  obligatory  and  non-
obligatory  was  introduced,  to  become  known  as  the  "Harmel  list".  With  the 
creation  of  new  common  policies,  such  as  regional  policy,  classification 
became  a  matter  of  dispute  between  Parliament  and  the  Council.  Meanwhile 
Parliament  also  began  to  question  the  classification  of  certain  budget 
headings  in  the  common  agricultural  policy,  such as food  aid,  which  led to a 
conflict  with  the  Counci 1  on  the  1982  budget  and  resulted  in  the  Council 
taking  the  matter  before  the  Court  of  Justice.  This  led  on  30  June  1982  to 
the  joint  declaration  by  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
Commission  on  various  measures  to  improve  the  budgetary procedure,  which  was 
concerned  primarily  with  the  classification  of  expend! ture  and  included  a 
list  classifying  each  existing  budget  heading.  A procedure  was  also  agreed 
for  the  classification of  new  budget  headings  or existing ones  whch  had  been 
put  on  a  new  legal  basis.  But  differences of  opinion  between  the  Council  and 
Parliament  on  the  classification  of  expenditure  as  obligatory  or  non-
obligatory remained  in various areas,  even after this joint declaration. 
<c>  The  inclusion of certain expenditure in the budget:  Although  Article 199 
of  the  EEC  Treaty  sets  out  the  classical  principle  recognized  by  all  the 
Member  States  of  the  all-embracing  nature  of  the  Community  budget,  it  has 
turned  out  that  the  Community  also  manages  appropriations  not  included  in 
the general  budget  which  would  make  up  a  significant part of that budget,  and 
which are as  follows: 
- 32  -- expenditure financed  from  the  ECSC  levy; 
- lending and  borrowing operations,  which  have  increased with the creation of 
the lew Community  Instrument  <ICI>; 
- expenditure  by  the  European  Development  Fund  which continues to be  financed 
from Member  States'  contributions. 
Parliament  continues  to  urge  that  all  these  appropriations  which  are  not 
included  under  the  budgetary  procedure  introduced  in 1970  and  1975  should  be 
included in the general  budget  of  the European Community. 
<d>  The  problem  of  own  resources  and  future  financing:  Besides  the 
Community's  traditional  sources  of  revenue  <customs  duties,  agricultural-
levies,  etc.>,  the  1970  Treaty· transferred to  the  Community  an  amount  of  up 
to  1%  of  the  Xember  States'  VAT  revenue  as  own  resources.  The  escalation of 
the  common  agricultural  policy  and  the  creation  or  expansion  of  various 
Community  policies  meant  that  this  1~ ceiling  was  soon  reached,  so  that  the 
problem  of  the  Community's  inadequate  own  resources  has  become  increasingly 
acute  in recent  years.  The  decision to raise  the ceiling to 1.4%  in 1986  and 
the  proposed  rise to  1.6%  in 1988  still could  not  cover  the  requirements,  so 
that  some  budgets  could  only  be  financed  by  special  contributions  from  the 
Xember  States.  In  February  1988  the  European  Council  in Brussels agreed  on  a 
package  of  measures  to guarantee  the  future  financing of  the  Community.  They 
introduced  a  new  category  of  own  resources,  calculated  on  the  basis  of  a 
percentage  of  the  Member  States'  GJP.  Measures  were  also  agreed  to  check 
agricultural  expend! ture  and  improve  budgetary  discipline,  as  reflected  in 
the  •Interinstitutional  agreement  on  budgetary  discipline  and  improvement  of 
the  budgetary  procedure",  which  also  defined  the  financial  perspective  for 
1988-1992,  adopted  by  the  three  institutions  involved  in  the  budgetary 
procedure,  Parliament,  the  Council  and the Commdssion.  That should ensure the 
financing of the  Community  until  1992,  the year of completion of the  European 
internal  market. 
- 33  -IV.  PARIH";IPATIOI II BIIERJAL  REI.ATIQJS  AID  THEIR  COITROL 
In  this  area,  the  Single  European  Act  has  shifted  the  inter-institutional 
balance  quite  considerably  in  favour  of  the  European  Parliament,  which  now 
has a  power  of  co-decision in respect of association agreements and accession 
treaties  and,  in the  field  of  European  Poliical  Cooperation,  knows  that  the 
Foreign  Ministers  must  take  due  account  of  its  resolutions.  However,  the 
democratic  deficit  in  this  highly  important  sector  remains,  especially  as 
regards the common  commercial  policy  <Article  113  of  the  EEC  Treaty>. 
1.  Parliament's assent 
Articles 237  <accession treaties>  and 238  <association agreements>  of the  EEC 
Treaty  establish  the  need  for  Parliament  to  give  its  assent  before  the 
conclusion  of  such  agreements  by  the  Council.  The  European  Parliament 
pronounces  by  an  absolute  majority  of  the  votes  of  its current  Members  <at 
present 260  votes>. 
This  power  may  be  regarded  as  a  co-decision  power  now  shared  between  the 
Council  and  the European  Parliament.  Rules  32  and  33  of Parliament's Rules of 
Procedure  set  out  the  information  procedures.  Any  application  by  a  European 
State  to  become  a  member  of  the  Community  is  referred  to  the  appropriate 
committee  for  consideration.  Parliament  may  decide,  on  a  proposal  from  the 
commdttee  responsible,  a  political  group or at least twenty-three  Members,  to 
request  the  Commission  and  the  Council  to  take  part  in  a  debate  before 
negotiations with the applicant State commence. 
In  the  case  of  association  agreements,  the  European  Parliament  may,  on  a 
proposal  from  the  committee  responsible,  a  political  group  or  at  least 
twenty-three  Members,  ask the  Council  to be  consulted before the negotiations 
an  the  conclusion,  renewal  or  amendment  of  an  association  agreement  or 
financial  protocol  commence.  In  this  case  the  information  relates  to  the 
negotiating mandate  the Council  proposes to give  the  Commission. 
- 34 The  Commission  and  the  Council  must  keep  Parliament  informed,  through  the 
appropriate committees,  of progress in such negotiations. 
When  the  negotiations  are  completed,  but  before  any  agreement  is  signed, 
Parliament  may  decided to  hold a  debate  on  the proposed terms,  in the  case of 
an  appl icaticn  for accession. 
The  European  Parliament  gives  its assent  to  an  application  for  accession  to 
the  Community  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  of its current  Members  on  the  basis 
of  a  report  by  the  committee  responsible. 
In  the  case  of  association  agreements,  when  the  negotiations  are  completed 
but  before  any  agreement  is ·signed,  the  draft  agreement  is  submitted  to 
Parliament  for assent. 
2.  Significant  international  aireements 
Parliament  may  decide  that  it  considers  any  international  agreement,  other 
than  accession treaties or association  agreements,  as significant  within  the 
terms  of  the  Solemn  Declaration  on  European  Union  <Rule  34  of  the  Rules  of 
Procedure>. 
The  European  Parliament  decides  on  the  basis  of  a  report  by  the  committee 
responsible and after being informed  by  the Commdssion. 
The  procedure  set  out  in  the  Rules  of  Procedure  relating  to  association 
agreements also applies to significant international agreements. 
3.  Trade  and cooperation aireements 
Parliament  may  ask  the  Council  to be  consul ted on  the  negotiating  mandate  whch 
the  Council  intends  to  give  the  Commission  before  the  negotiations  on  the 
conclusion of a  trade  or cooperation agreement  commence  <Rule  35  of  the Rules 
of  Procedure>.  Parliament  must  be  kept  informed before  the negotiations begin 
- 35  -and  in  the  course  of  the  negotiations  and  will  then  hold  a  debate  on  the 
basis of a  report by  the  commdttee  responsible. 
4~  Other external  ~ewers resylting from the Sinale European  Act 
In  the  field  of  research  and  technological  development,  the  Community  may 
cooperate  with third countries or  international  organizations on  the basis of 
international  agreements  negotiated and  concluded  pursuant  to  Article  228  of 
the EEC  Treaty  <Article 130  N of  the  EEC  Treaty>. 
Environmental  policy  may  involve  similar  measures  of  international 
cooperation  and  the  conclusion  of  similar  agreements  <Rule  130  R  <5>  of  the 
EEC  Treaty>. 
In this context,  the European Parliament must  be consulted in accordance  with 
the various applicable procedures. 
5.  The  Lyns-Westerterp procedures 
For  the  time  being  these  procedures  remain  applicable  in spite of  the  entry 
into  force  of  the  Single  European  Act,  but  they  are  sure  to  be  adjusted to 
the new  situation in time. 
Association agreements 
The  Council  decided  <LUIS  procedure>  in  February  1964  that  a  debate  may  be 
held  in  the  European  Parliament  before  the  commencement  of  negotiations  on 
the  association  of  a  third  country  with  the  Community.  During  such 
negotiations,  close  contacts  are  maintained  between  the  Commission  and  the 
responsible  Parliamentary  committees.  When  the  negotiations  are  completed, 
but  before  any  agreement  is  signed,  the  President  of  the  Council  or  his 
representative  inform  the  responsible  committees  confidentially  and 
unofficially  of  the  substance  of  the  agreement  <Minutes  of  the  Council 
meeting of 24/24  February 1964,  p.  26>. 
- 36  -CoDmercial  agreeDents  <Luns-Westerterp procedure> 
In  October  1973  the  Council  laid down  the  procedures  for  the  information and 
consultation of the European  Parliament: 
Before  the  beginning  of  negotiations  on  commercial  agreements  with  a  third 
country  and  in  the  light  of  the  information  provided  by  the  Council  to  the 
responsible  Parliamentary  committees,  the  Parliament  may  in  appropriate  cases 
hold a  debate. 
Vhen  the  negotiations are  completed,  but  before  any  agreement  is signed,  the 
President  of  the  Council  or  his  representative  inform  the  responsible 
commdttees confidentially and unofficially of the substance of  the agreement. 
Bearing  in  r.1ind  the  Parliament's  interest  in  the  conclusion  of  cormercial 
agreements  by  the  Community,  the  Council  will inform  the  Parliament  of  the 
substance of such agreements before they are signed or concluded. 
<Council  Note  of 16  October 1973>. 
The  Council  laid  down  implementing  procedures  for  the  "LUllS-VESTERTERP" 
procedures,  considering  that  experience  has  shown  the  need  to  distinguish 
between general  agreements and  others. 
The  Solemn  Declaration on European Union 
This declaration provides that in addition to the consultations provided for 
in the Treaties,  the opinion of the European ParllaDent will be sought before 
the conclusion of other significant international agreements by the CoDmUnity 
and the accession of a  State to the Buropean CoDaUnity. 
The  existiBg  procedures  for  providiBg  the  Buropean  Parliament  with 
confidential  and  unofficial  information  on  progress  in negotiations  will  be 
extended,  taking into account  the requirements of urgency,  to all significant 
international  agreements  concluded  by  the  ComDUnities  <Solemn  Declaration on 
European Union,  paragraph 2.3.7>. 
- 37  -6.  Burapean Political Cooperation 
In this field.  the Solemn  Declaration on  European  Union codifies a  nuuber of 
earlier practices. 
The  Presidency  of  political  cooperation  keeps  the  European  Parliament 
regularly informed through the Political Affairs CoDDdttee  of the subjects of 
foreign  policy  exalld.ned  in  the  context  of  European  Poll  tical  Cooperation 
<paragraph 2.3.4>. 
Since  19'73 1  the  Foreign  Jllnister  have  met  on  a  quarterly  basis  to  hold 
colloquies  with  the Political Affairs  Co~ttee <Rule  5'7<4>  of Parliament's 
Rules of Procedure>. 
Once  a  year  the  Presidency  reports  to  the  European  ParliaDent  in  plenary 
session  on  progress  in  the  field  of  political  cooperation  <paragraph  2.3.4 
and Rule 57<3>  of the Rules of Procedure>.  Parliament discusses this report. 
The  Single Act  also codifies certain practices,  henceforth included in an act 
with the value of a  treaty. 
One  sign of Parliament's increasing importance  in external relations is that 
the  Foreign  JUnisters  meeting  in  Buropean  Political  Cooperation  must  take 
due  account  of  the  resolutions of  the  European  Parliament  <Article  30<4>  of 
the Single European Act>. 
These  provisions  give  the  European  Parliament  fairly  wide  powers  to  monitor 
the  joint implementation by the Foreign Jlnisters of European  foreign policy, 
as laid down  in the Single  Act,  with  respect also to  questions of  Buropean 
security where  closer cooperation is envisaged,  together with coordination on 
its political and econoDdc  aspects. 
- 38  -Rule  57  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  provides  that  the  Presidency of  European 
Political  Cooperation  shall  report  regularly  to  Parliament  on  the  foreign 
policy matters  examined  in the  framework  of  European political cooperation 
and  also  on  the  extent  to  which  the  views  of  Parliament  on  these  matters 
have  been  taken into account. 
Parliament  may  hold  a  debate  on  this  matter,  during  which  the  Commission 
will  also  be  heard.  The  Presidency  of  European  Political  Cooperation  and 
the  Commission  must  also  ensure  that  the  external  policy  of  the  European 
Community  and  the  policies  agreed  in  European  Pol! tical  Cooperation  are 
consistent and  must  inform Parliament of all contradictions which arise. 
Henceforth  the  European  Parliament  will  play  a  fundamental  role  in giving 
the  necessary  impetus  to  the  creation  of  a  European  foreign  policy  and 
monitoring  its  implementation,  especially  when  all  the  machinery  that  has 
been  proposed and progressively set up  becomes  operational. 
V.  TRB  BtJRQPHAI  PARI.IAJIBJT' S  STRATEGY  FOR  RBOOCIIG  IHB  Dli!OCRATIC  DBFICIT 
II IHB  BURQPEAI  COJ!UJIIT 
The  European  Parliament  is  pursuing  the  objective  of  achieving  European 
Union.  To  that  end,  it  is  now  resolved  to  make  the  utmost  use  of  the 
opportunities  offered  by  the  Single  European  Act  and  to  improve  its 
relations  with  the  other  Community  institutions,  while  also  adjusting its 
working procedures to its new  responsibilities in the legislative field. 
Moreover,  it  would  seem  likely  that  institutional  progress  will  be  easier 
to  achieve  if  there  are  major  advances  in  the  actual  substance  of  the 
Community  policies. 
The  priority  objective  of  the  European  Parliament  is  to  reduce  the 
democratic  deficit,  an  aim  indissolubly  linked  to  the  creation  of  the 
European  Union.  In  a  resolution  adopted  on  17  June  1988,  the  European 
Parliament deplores the fact  that the loss of democratic  powers by the 
- 39  -national  parliaments  was  not  counterbalanced  by  increased  control  at  the 
level  of  the  European  Co~nity. The  concentration of legislative powers  in 
the  hands  of  the  Council  and  the  manner  in  which  these  powers  are 
exercized,  especially  the  fact  that  legislation is adopted  in  camera,  has 
created an  institutional  imbalance  which  is responsible for this democratic 
deficit. 
Consequently.  this democratic deficit can only be  corrected at the  level  of 
the Community  itself,  by  a  redistribution of  powers  between  the Council  and 
Parliament. 
The  European  Parliament  considers  that  the  best  way  would  be  for  the 
Parliament  elected in  June  1989  to  be  instructed to draw  up  a  draft treaty 
on  European  Union  and  for  a  referendum  to  be  organized  at  European  level 
or,  failing  that,  in  those  Member  States  that  agreed  to  it.  That  would 
also  act  as  a  means  of  involving  the  people  of  Europe  more  closely  in  the 
creation of  European  Union. 
This strategy needs  the  support  of public opinion and the active backing of 
the  political  forces.  To  that  end,  the  European  Parliament  will  take 
account  of  the  views  of  the  various national  bodies  <parliaments,  political. 
parties,  economic  and  social  groups>  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  widest 
possible consensus on  the final  text of  the draft treaty. 
Within  the  European  Parliament,  the  poll  tical  groups  <which  are  not a 
subject  of  this  paper>  play  a  key  role  in making  proposals  on  this  matter 
and  increasing the pressure at Community  and  national  level. 
Another  aspect  of  this  strategy  is  to  ask  the  political  forces  in  the 
Member  States and  the  national  parliaments of  the  Member  States to take the 
necessary  steps  to  obtain  the  assent  of  the  national  governments  for  this 
proposed  Union  and  for  public  opinion  to  be  consul  ted  on  granting  the 
European Parliament constituent powers  <resolution of  17  June  1988>. 
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